Erbil Agreement 2010

In the March 2010 parliamentary elections, Prime Minister al-Maliki did not win the most seats. The 89 seats of his party (out of 325 possible) were awarded by the party of Ayad Allawi 91. Other Shiite parties – in particular supporters of the Muqtada Sadr clergy and the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) – won 77 seats together and the Kurds won 57 seats. Yet al-Maliki maneuvered Allawi, convincing al-Sadr and ISCI to join him in forming the largest bloc in Parliament that Iraq`s Supreme Court was to grant to Al-Maliki when the new government was formed in Allawi. Third, the Erbil agreement was essentially two separate agreements. It was not a national pact in which all parties met at the centre, but a somewhat contradictory set of demands from the voices of discrete parties with different agendas. The negotiation of separate agreements with different parties – and the public distribution of the entrinses – allowed al-Maliki to make promises that opposed his rivals, such as the promise of the defence post to Iraqiya (despite the Shiite and Kurdish sensibilities) or the commitment to implement Article 140 (despite opposition from the worried Sunni and Turkish communities). Second, an agreement must be transparent and applicable in public opinion. The agreement should be published so that Iraqi public opinion can see it and internalize its content. Public criticism of Iraqi politicians and parties can effectively influence their behaviour and should be used in this area. The agreement would be even more credible if facilitated by a third party or an influential party. The United Nations, alone or in cooperation with the United States, Turkey, the European Union and Iran, could contribute to the mediation of an agreement and to ensure that all parties respect it. The problem is therefore how to enforce the Erbil agreement and contain the PYD`s historical ties with the PKK.

“Iraqi Kurdistan and federalism,” said Dr. Semo, the PYD`s foreign affairs chief, “has not been a successful model,” continuing to cause a stir and talking about problems with Baghdad and too much dependence on Turkey. [17] While this gap between Erbil and the PYD persists, the PYD continues to stick to the unification agreement and denounces the PKK. [18] Although the Erbil agreement lacks concrete decisions on leadership and organization, Assad`s external threat has united the KNC and the PYD.